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Roman: Rethinking Revocation: Adoption from a New Perspective

NOTE
RETHINKING REVOCATION: ADOPTION FROM
A NEW PERSPECTIVE
Adoption transformed my feelings about infertility and my understanding of what parental love is all about. For years I had felt that
there was only one less-than-tragic outcome of my infertility battle,
and that was to reverse the damage that had been done to my body,
the damage that stood in the way of pregnancy. I had felt that there
was only one really satisfactory route to parenthood, and that was
for me to conceive and give birth. I had assumed that the love I
felt for my first [biologic] child had significantly to do with biologic connection. The experience of loving him was wrapped up in
a package that included pregnancy, childbirth, nursing, and the genetic link that meant I recognized his eyes and face and personality
as familial. Adoption posed terrifying questions. Could I love in the
same way a child who had not been part of me and was not born
from my body? Could I feel that totality of commitment I associated with parental love toward a child who came to me as a baby
stranger? Or did the form of attachment I had known with my first
child arise out of the biologic inevitability felt in the progression
from sexual intercourse to pregnancy to childbirth, and out of the
genetic link between us?
I discovered that the thing I know as parental love grows out
of the experience of nurturing, and that adoptive parenting is in
fundamental ways identical to biologic parenting.... I do not see
biologic links as entirely irrelevant to parenting, but neither do I see
an obvious hierarchical system for ranking biologic and adoptive
parenting.... You do not in fact live on just because your egg or
The sense of immortality
sperm has contributed to another life....
that many seek in parenting seems to me to have more to do with
the kind of identification that comes from our relationship with our
children, and with the ways in which that relationship helps shape
their being.'

1. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLrTICS OF
PARENTING xvii-xviii (1993). Many of the themes woven throughout this Note were introduced to me in a speech I heard Elizabeth Bartholet deliver to the Westchester Adoptive
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I. INTRODUCTION

Parenthood is a role which most people take for granted that
they will one day assume-a vision deeply rooted in American culture and continually reinforced by social norms.2 Additionally, the
biological link between parents and children is taken for granted.
Women are raised to see themselves as childbearers;3 men to see
themselves as studs imbued with the power of procreation as a sign
of masculinity.4 Such socialization has led to pervasive cultural
themes: a woman must produce a child to give full resonance to her
identity as a woman; a child must be raised by her biologic parent to
achieve the success and identity that comes from a genetic heritage.
Not everyone, however, can actualize the vision of biologic parenthood. In this country, approximately one-sixth of all people of
childbearing age are infertile.5 The inability to achieve the culturally
promulgated desire to produce offspring is frequently devastating6 and
leads many desperate people to zealously pursue new reproductive
technologies that promise the "last tantalizing possibility" of biologic
parenthood.7 On the other end of the spectrum are women who become pregnant but do not abort and yet do not want to parent. These

Parents' Committee, and later in a reading of Family Bonds. Both experiences influenced me
greatly in preparing this Note.
2. See BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 141 (1989); see also ELINOR B. ROSENBERG, THE
ADOPTION LIFE CYCLE: THE CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILES THROUGH THE YEARS 50

(1992).
3. Rothman, supra note 2, at 141-42; see also RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE
(1976) (noting that sociobiology teaches us that all human beings are genetically programmed
for reproduction).
4. Judith Lorber, In Vitro Fertilization and Gender Politics, in EMBRYOS, ETHICS, AND
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 124-25 (E. Baruch et al. eds., 1988).
5. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK: UNITED STATES DATA,
REGULATIONS, AND RESOURCES 157 (1989) [hereinafter FACTBOOK].
6. ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 50-57; see also Tony Kornheiser, For Millions of
Couples, the Curse of Infertility Breeds Pain, Pressure and Desperation, PEOPLE WKLY., Feb.
13, 1984, at 83.
7. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 10 (May 1988) [hereinafter OTA] (reporting that
Americans spent over one billion dollars on infertility treatment in 1987); see also Melinda
Beck et al., How Far Should We Push Mother Nature?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17, 1994, at 54
(reporting that currently there are approximately 300 assisted-fertility clinics in the U.S.,
which generate almost two billion dollars a year).
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women are "bombard[ed] with the message that they should raise
their children themselves at whatever cost" because "true" mothers do
not "give away" or "abandon" their children These messages often
compel some women who have relinquished their children for adoption to try to void their consent and to reclaim their children after
they have already been placed with other families.9 Courts sometimes
bow to these attempts in the belief that children belong with their
biologic mothers.'0
The myth perpetuated by a legal system that favors the rights of
biologic mothers over adoptive ones, based purely on genealogy, is
that women are to be valued primarily for their reproductive capacity.
It reinforces the stereotypical notion that in parenthood, genetic links
are more valuable than psychological ones, and promotes institutional
biases in favor of biologic parenthood." This culturally created myth
simultaneously reveals and constructs reality and reflects and refracts
acknowledged yet unchallenged assumptions and prejudices about
motherhood. Judges and legislators, both consciously and unconsciously, rely upon this myth in their decisions while sitting in the unique
position of reinforcing or uprooting it. Indeed, the myth embodies
some of the most deeply internalized assumptions about human nature.
This Note will explore the statutorily created institution of adoption from the perspective of adoptive parents. Part II will discuss the
historical background of adoption. It will explore how adoptive
parenting came to be stigmatized and subverted in our culture to the
point that judges and legislators paternalistically have bent over backwards to preserve the biologic bond between parents and children. It
will examine the legal and social obstacles that conspire to relegate
adoption to a last resort form of becoming a parent.
Part I will examine the issues surrounding adoption revocation
and review the history of consent withdrawal. Part IV will outline the
legal options that address this problem as legislated in various juris-

8. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at xxi-xxii.

9. Karen Stabiner, The Baby Brokers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1988 (Magazine), at 36
(reporting that this occurs in about ten percent of adoption cases, including both pre- and
post-placement occurrences); see also infra text accompanying note 98.
10. There are no statistics but only anecdotal accounts on the results of these cases. See
discussion infra part IlI.
It. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood,98 YALE LJ. 293 (1988) (discussing how concepts of parenthood lead judges to resolve parental custody disputes between
biologic parents so that social relationships are downplayed).
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dictions. Part V will propose a solution to reverse the patriarchally
inspired bias against adoptive parents. Currently, individual state statutes provide time frames within which biologic parents can withdraw
their consent to adoption. 2 These range from a few days to several
months, often directing the court to assess the situation in light of the
when consent
child's "best interest."' 3 Some provide for revocation
14
has been given under fraud, duress, or coercion.
This Note proposes that adoption revocations should only be
sanctioned when the biologic mother's consent was obtained by fraud,
duress, or coercion as practiced by the adoptive parents or their
agents. Such a standard will promote finality in child-placement cases.
To do otherwise is to denigrate adoptive parenting and disempower
women by maintaining a system whereby judges step in to "save"
biologic mothers from their own decisions. The law must demythologize the image, fashioned under the influence of patriarchal
ideology, of the innocent Madonna and her child, and help society
focus on the image of a child raised by loving, capable parents.
AN OVERVIEW OF ADOPTION

II.

A.

The History of Adoption

The practice of adoption, as we know it today, grew out of
ominous beginnings. Unlike most other state law, the American law
of adoption did not derive from British common law,"5 but rather
from the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi and Roman law, 6 where
adoption was governed by the principle "adoptio naturam
imitatur"--"adoption imitates nature."17 The earliest analogue to
adoption in Britain were the Elizabethan Poor Laws, under which orphaned children were "bound out" as indentured servants to work in
-

------------------------

12. See infra pp. 752-57.
13. See infra pp. 753-54.
14. See infra pp. 754-57.
15. ARTHUR SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE: SEALED OR OPEN RECORDS:
How THEY AFFECT ADOPTEES, BIRTH PARENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS 28 (rev. cd., Coro-

na Publishing Co. 1984). England did not provide for adoption by law until 1926. This has
been attributed to the English culture's high regard for blood lineage. Id.
16. The Code of Hammurabi provided: "If a man take a child in his name, adopt and
rear him as a son, the grown-up son may not be demanded back. if a man adopt a child as
his son, after he has taken him, he transgresses against his foster-father; that adopted son
shall return to the house of his own father." It ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITrANICA Law 135 (1947).

17. Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption,

II J. FAM. L. 443, 446-48 (1971).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss3/5

4

Roman: Rethinking Revocation: Adoption from a New Perspective
RETHINKING REVOCATION

19951

exchange for food, shelter, and education. 8
This indenture system was imported to colonial America. In the

early 1800s, indenturing was a popular means of providing for
parentless children. 9 Early laws allowed poor parents to sell their

children like property to be used as cheap labor,2° while children
who could not be sold were often put in asylums with the poor and
mentally ill.2
In the mid-nineteenth century, a minister named Charles Loring
Brace founded the Children's Aid Society and instituted an "orphan
train" movement that sent thousands of abandoned children to live in
the midwest, the south, and Texas.' These children were taken to

town meeting halls where, frozen with fright, they were made to
perform skits for groups of potential adopters who took home the
child of their choice.' These children were never formally adopted
so that either the adopter or the child could end the relationship at

any time.'
The first American adoption statute was enacted in Massachusetts
in 1851 and was modeled after Roman adoption law.' Unlike adop-

tion laws in other cultures, 6 this statute imposed strict qualifications

for adoptive parents to ensure the welfare of the children.27 It also

aimed to protect the rights of adopters who previously had no legal
recourse if a birthmother tried to undo an adoption.2 8 By 1931,
adoption was legally provided for in every state in the country.29

18. FACTBOOK, supra note 5, at 18.
19. Id.; see also Presser, supra note 17, at 472-78 (noting that industrialization brought
many economic changes which caused an increase in the number of neglected children).
20. SOROSKY Er AL., supra note 15, at 31.
21. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Spectre?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 923 (1991).
22. These orphan trains existed until 1929. Id. at 923-24.
23. Id. at 924.
24. Id.
25. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 324 (1851). This pioneering statute required written
consent of birthparents, joint petition by both adoptive parents, a decree of adoption by a
judge, and legal and complete severance between the child and the birthparents. FACrBOOK,
supra note 5, at 18.
26. Adoption is a revered form of family in Pacific island cultures. In Tahiti, for example, twenty-five to forty percent of all children are adopted in a practice that is considered at
the top of the family hierarchy. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 169-70.
27. Dickson, supra note 21, at 924. Historically, adoption was based upon the needs of
the adopters, such as "to prevent the extinction of a family bloodline and to facilitate property transmission." Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 925.
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B. The Current System
In an agency adoption, a birthmother gives her child to a publicly licensed agency, which places the child with a family of the
agency's choosing.30 Usually, the child is placed in foster care until
the birthmother's consent becomes irrevocable. 31 The adoption becomes final by judicial decree predicated upon a satisfactory finding
by a social worker.32 Agency adoptions are generally disfavored because of their rigid bureaucratic selection procedures and long waits
for healthy infants.33
In independent adoptions, a birthmother places her child with a
family of her choice, usually through a doctor or lawyer acting as an
intermediary. 4 Amongst the adopters expenses are legal fees and the
birthmother's medical expenses. The adopters typically take the
infant home directly from the hospital. Most states require adoptive
parents to undergo a social work investigation of parental fitness
before the adoption can be finalized.36 The wait for a healthy infant
in independent adoptions is generally three months to two years,37
but the implications of a birthmother revoking consent to adoption in
independent adoptions are more serious because the adoptive parents
have already bonded with the child.38
C. Cultural Distortions of the System
Adoption's unsavory history combined with the historical stereotyping of birthmothers, adoptive parents, and children, has contributed
greatly to society's negative perception of adoption and continues to
influence adoption law and practice.39

30. Id. at 934.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See FACrBOOK, supra note 5, at 175. The wait for a healthy newborn in agency
adoptions can be as short as two years or as long as ten years. Id.
34. Lois GummN, THE ADOPTION RESOURCE BOOK 72 (3d ed. 1992).
35. Id. at 91-94 (listing the various expenses that may arise during an independent
adoption).
36. FACTBOOK, supra note 5, at 20.
37. Id. at 175.
38. See Dickson, supra note 21, at 968.
39. IU. at 925-26. Much of the information and many of the ideas for this section were
garnered from Dickson's article.
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1. Birthmothers
Historically, women were valued exclusively for their reproductive capacity.' It was considered their obligation to bear children
within a marriage and a sin to do so outside of marriage.4 ' As a

result, nonmarital pregnancy has historically been considered nearly

criminal in American law and society.42 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, unwed mothers and their children were often punished by being publicly displayed in the town square.43 Popular
myths described unwed mothers as misguided, masochistic, ignorant,

and uncontrollable.'
Today these portrayals have largely been rejected, supplanted by

a recognition that single women get pregnant by choice or by accident and not as a result of an inferior nature. Additionally, the wom-

an who places her child for adoption is not always poor and exploitable. She is usually a young, middle-class woman who became pregnant accidently.45
There are many studies that depict the pain suffered by
birthmothers who place their children for adoption, yet very few of
these studies provide a basis of comparison with the experience of
women in similar circumstances who kept their children." One study

that provided such a unique, relevant comparison revealed that single
birthmothers who placed their children for adoption, when compared

with single mothers who kept their children, were generally more
likely to finish high school, less likely to live in poverty or receive
public assistance, and no more likely to suffer psychologically as a

result of their decisions.47 According to one 1986 study, over six
40.

CARNmEL SHALEv, BIRTH POWER, THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 21 (1989).

41. Id. at 26. "In marriage a woman's motherhood was revered and idolized; outside
marriage it was abhorred and condemned. As a result, women were divided, often along lines
of class and race, into two classes-virtuous madonna (virgin) and fallen whore."
42. See Dickson, supra note 21, at 926-29.
43. Id. at 926; see also NATHANmL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (5th ed. 1990)
(fictionalizing such harsh treatment in the tale of Hester Prynne).
44. See SHALEV, supra note 40, at 31.
45. David K. Leavitt, The Model Adoption Act: Return to a Balanced View of Adoption,
19 FAM. L. Q. 141, 144 (1985). The statistical basis of these facts must be viewed, however,
in light of the current policy debate targeting "illegitimacy" and "out-of-wedlock"
births/single-parent-families as the root cause of the most serious social problems.
46. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 177. A study of mothers who kept their children
might reveal the pain of raising an unwanted child alone, without an education or a job.
47. FACTmOOK, supra note 5, at 148-49. "In one study, mothers who relinquished their
babies scored higher on standardized personality tests . . . and were thus considered healthier

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:733

million American homes were headed by a single mother, sixty-six
percent of whom also worked outside the home.48 In contrast, only

ten percent of single teenage mothers who kept their babies were
employed and surviving without welfare.49 Ninety percent of these

single mothers never completed high school."
2. Adoptive Parents
Adoptive parents are motivated to adopt, in most instances, because they are unable to produce a child due to sterility, repeated

miscarriages, hysterectomies, or other more complex conditions resulting in infertility." Just as unwed mothers were seen as "violat[ing]

the natural order" of life, married women who did not bear children
were historically vilified. 2 Motherhood has been culturally
mythologized to the point where it has been perceived as the defining
characteristic of a woman's existence, 3 such that women who re-

mained childless were shunned by society.' In ancient Christian tradition, the ability to bear a lot of children was a sign of God's
grace,5 while infertility was considered the manifestation of sin and
punishment. 6
During the 1800s, sterility was sometimes blamed on a woman's

and 'higher functioning.' ROSENBERG supra note 2, at 18.
48. Leavitt, supra note 45, at 143.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. SOROSKY Er AL., supra note 15, at 73; see also BARTHOLEr, supra note 1, at xx,
172 (noting that adoptive families are thus often begun on a foundation of human despair, as
many adoptive parents feel forced to pursue this form of parenting due to a physical "inadequacy").
52. Dickson, supra note 21, at 929-31.
53. In 1870, a doctor described reproduction in this way: It is "'as if the Almighty, in
creating the female sex, had taken the uterus and built up a woman around it."' Caroll
Smith-Rosenberg & Charles Rosenberg, The Female Animal: Medical and Biological Views of
Woman and Her Role in Nineteenth-Century America, 60 J. AM. HIST. 332, 335 (1983)
(quoting M.L. HOLBROOK, PARTURlTION WrTHOUT PAIN: A CODE OF DIRECTIONS FOR ESCAPING FROM THE PRIMAL CURSE 14-15 (1882)). Noted legal scholar, Martha Fineman, echoes
this: "Motherhood has a [powerful symbolic] impact on all women .... It comes from the
durability and tenacity of the assumptions made about any individual woman that we are
forged in the context of the cultural and social forces that define the 'essential' or idealized
woman." Martha Fineman, Images of Mother in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE LJ. 274,
276 (1991).
54. M. GOLD, AND HANNAH WEPT: INFERTILITY, ADOPTION, AND THE JEWISH COUPLE
47 (1988). According to ancient Jewish law, an infertile woman could be divorced by her
husband after ten years of marriage. Id.
55. See SHALEV, supra note 40, at 27.
56. GOLD, supra note 54, at 28.
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immorality or sexual perversion.57 Doctors even linked sterility to a

woman's involvement in business or politics, as if a woman's brain
and reproductive organs could not develop simultaneously." This

view has a modem analogue in the popular myth that infertility resuits from stress or other psychosomatic defects.59

The biologic reductivism manifest in this emphasis on fertility
and procreation as the definitional marker for womanhood serves to
circumscribe a woman's societal value.' The imperative that women
be mothers and children be biologic is a powerful social directive,
with which close to five million women cannot comply." By focusing on women's reproductive capacity or incapacity, society reinforces

stereotypical notions of women valued mainly as childbearers. As reproductive medical technology advances, genetic links are further
deified and a reconceptualization of parenthood as based on loving

relationships rather than biology is obstructed. As a result, infertile
women feel pressured to pursue biologic parenthood rather than explore the possibility of adopting.62 Such pressure devalues adoptive

child-parent relationships and promotes institutional biases favoring
biologic parenthood.63
The cultural themes perpetrated herein are reflected in a legal
system that operates by erecting a series of barriers that separate
adoptive parents from the children they seek to parent. Fitness screen-

ing, locating children, racial and cultural matching, financial obligations, and protracted litigation regarding ultimate parental rights are

57. See Smith-Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 53, at 334-38 (1983). Perversion
included the use of birth control. la. at 343-50.
58. See id. at 340-43.
59. GOLD, supra note 54, at 67. Infertile couples are always initially told that if they
would just relax, they would get pregnant.
60. Madeline Henley, The Creation and Perpetuation of the Mother/Body Myth: Judicial
and Legislative Enlistment of Norplant, 41 BuFF. L. REV. 703, 710 n.33 (1993).
For too long this nation has regulated women's status through the institution of
motherhood. Its judgments about the ways in which it is reasonable to impose on
women as mothers are deeply distorted by a long history of denigrating, controlling, and using women as mothers. For this reason, the physiological paradigms
that currently dominate review of reproductive regulation are deeply pernicious.
Id. (quoting Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 380 (1992).
61. See OTA, supra note 7, at 10.
62. See generally BARTHOLEr, supra note 1, at 187-229 (discussing the fact that infertile
couples are strongly dissuaded from adopting by their desire for biologic parenthood). See
FACrBOOK, supra note 5, at 157 (explaining that many interested couples are discouraged
from adopting "due to long waits and restrictive criteria for prospective adoptive parents").
63. BARTHOLET, supra note I, at 164-65.
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all obstacles that adoptive parents must have the endurance to overcome in their quest to adopt a child.' In custody disputes, this same
system rarely gives the presumption of legal parenthood to a
nonbiologic parent.'
Adoptive parents must face the stigma that they are exploiting
poor, ignorant birthmothers. There is a strong public misperception
that adoptions, particularly independent ones, are arranged by a channel of unscrupulous lawyers trafficking in babies for adoptive parents
willing to pay the price, at the expense of victimized birthmothers."
While poverty has in the past caused many women to place their
children for adoption,' this is less true today,' and while the opportunity for exploitation may exist, it is not a foregone conclusion in
each case of adoption.69
Adopters must also overcome the stigma that adoptive parenting
is somehow inferior to biologic parenting; that they are not their
child's "real" parents." Yet, in actuality, the quality of "attachment
relationships" between adoptive or nonadoptive parents and their
children has been studied and found to be indistinguishable." Adoptive parents build their parental bonds on social, rather than genetic,
ties. The sanctity of such bonds has recently been acknowledged by
scholars who have noted that in today's world the importance of a
parent's role is based as much on psychology and intention as it is
on biology.72
3. Adopted Children
Most adoptees are the offspring of unwed mothers,73 and at one
time were deemed "illegitimate" and "filius nullius-the child of no
one."74 Historically, they were considered tainted by their mothers'

64. See generally BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 24-38.
65. Id.
66. Leavitt, supra note 45, at 145-46.
67. Dickson, supra note 21, at 932.
68. See Leavitt, supra note 45, at 144.
69. See BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at xxi.
70. Michael Bohman & Soren Sigvardsson, Outcome in Adoption: Lessons from Longitudinal. Studies, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 93, 94 (David Brodzinsky & Marshall
Schechter eds., 1990).
71. See BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 180.
72. See, e.g., John L. Hill, What Does it Mean to be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1991) (arguing that claims of
"intended" parents should prevail over those of biological or gestational parents).
73. 2 H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 567-68.
74. Dickson, supra note 21, at 927.
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sins and presumed to have inherited their mothers' inferior natures. 5
This view of adopted children is reflected in the perception of an
"adopted child syndrome," a view that holds that adopted children are
flawed in some way, more prone to criminal behavior, and that all
adopted children's problems can be blamed on their adoption.76 This
view has been further promulgated by the few, yet notorious,
adoptees who have used the "adopted child syndrome" as a defense

in a criminal trial.77 Most psychologists agree, however, that this
syndrome does not in fact exist."
The media often portrays adoptees as rootless searchers, "condemned to a life-long identity crisis by the secretive nature" of adoption.79 However, studies show that in reality adopted children rank
higher in standard measures of adjustment and self-esteem than children raised in foster care or by birthmothers who once considered

adoption but decided against it.8"
The problem with many studies of adoption is that they fail to

account for the many subgroups of adopted children" (e.g., children
adopted at birth, children adopted after the age of three, children
removed from abusive homes and then adopted), whose members may
have problems for reasons other than their adoption." In 1985,
Leslie Stein and Janet Hoopes studied a group of teenagers who had
been adopted before the age of two and compared them with a group

75. Id.
76. FACrBOOK, supra note 5, at 205-06.
77. For example, Patrick DeGelleke set fire to his house and killed his adoptive parents.
See Thomas J. Knudson, Expert Testifies Youth Killed Parents Because of "Adopted Child
Syndrome," N.Y. Tms, Feb. 18, 1986, at B2. Additionally, Joel Rifkin, the accused Long
Island serial killer attempted to assert this defense at his trial for murder. Maria Eftimiades,
The Quiet Man: A Methodical Misfit Is Suspected of Killing at Least 17 Women, PEOPLE
WKLY., Dec. 6, 1993, at 65.
78. FACT'BOOK, supra note 5, at 206.
79. Leavitt, supra note 45, at 142-43.
80. Bohman & Sigvardsson, supra note 70, at 100-06.
Adoption as a contemporary institution can be entirely vindicated by a comparison
of the groups of children born illegitimate who were adopted and who were not
adopted. To be born illegitimate and to be adopted is to have an advantage which
is shown in social adjustment, attainment and health. The striking success of adoption as an institution is shown by the marked extent to which adopted children
mirror their not-adopted social class peers rather than the group of illegitimate
children from whom they were originally drawn.
Leavitt, supra note 45, at 143 (quoting SEGLov, PRINGLE, & WEDGE, GROWING UP ADOPTED
171 (1972)).
81. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 177.
82. Id.
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of teenagers raised in biologic families of the same socioeconomic
class. 3 They found no difference in measurements of identity formation and adjustment and found that it was the quality of the parentchild relationship, not the adoptive status, that predicted success.'
When Stein and Hoopes asked the group of adopted children how it
felt to be adopted, most responded positively, but as one noted, "[iut's
not adoption that is the problem, but what other people think of
adopted kids."' s
D. Social Stigmas
The stigma surrounding adoption is a product of generations of
social conditioning.86 Today, adoption and the parties to it are virtual
victims of cultural distortion embodied in institutional forms.
Birthmothers are conditioned to keep their children, to the extent that
less than one percent of children born in this country are placed for
adoption.' The infertile are encouraged and driven by the medical
community and their own social conditioning, which equates their
ability to bear children with their value as human beings, to pursue
infertility treatment ad infinitum.88 Generally, it is only after exhausting all of their medical options that prospective parents even consider
adoption. 9
Adoptive parents and children are constantly assaulted by the
media messages that their families are inferior to biologically bound
ones.' Even popular fairy tales portray nonbiologic mothers (e.g.,
stepmothers) as ugly, cold, and abusive. They feed their children
poison apples and treat them like slaves; the children suffer until they
escape or are rescued by their birthparents.9"

83. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 180 & n.36 (citing LESLIE M. STEIN & JANET L..
HOOPES, IDENTITY FORMATION IN THE ADOPTED ADOLESCENT 34-46 (Child Welfare League
of America ed., 1985)).
84. Id.

85. Id. at 182 n.39.
86. Id. at 164.

87. Id. Only two percent of babies born to single mothers are placed for adoption. Id.
88. OTA, supra note 7, at 4-5. Visits to doctors for infertility treatments increased
threefold in the past three decades while infertility rates remained stable.
89. See BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 24.
90. There are a plethora of television talk shows that dramatize the search and reunion
theme and of movies that satirize the adoptive child's behavioral problems, e.g., PROBLEM
CHILD (Universal Studios 1990).
91. BARTHOLEr, supra note 1, at 165 & n.2 (referring to Rapunzel, Hansel and Gretel,
Snow White, and Cinderella).
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The language used in discussing adoption also reinforces the bias
in favor of biologic parenting. Adoptive children are asked, "Do you
know who your 'real' parents are?" In casual conversation and legislation, birthparents are often referred to as the "natural" parents.'
Adoptive parents are sometimes asked, "Are you still trying to have a
child of your own?" and "What made you decide to adopt?" as if the
adopted child were on loan and their motives in adopting were somehow more suspicious than those of people who have children biologically. Ideally, adoption should be looked upon as simply another
method of bringing a child into a family (other methods being cesarean section and natural childbirth) but in reality, the adoptive status of
a child is frequently mentioned needlessly, even when it has no relevance to the issue at hand. Consequently, the stigma surrounding
adoption is worsened.93
I. CONSENT WrrHDRAwAL AND ADOPTION REVOCATION

In independent adoptions, adoptive parents do not procure irrevocable parental rights until the adoption is finalized by judicial decree.' This finalization may not occur for months or even years after a child has been placed in a new home.9" By allowing a
birthmother as long as six months or a year to revoke her consent to
adoption, the law encourages her to change her mind.96 Such patriarchal laws, often given broad interpretative deference by traditionalist
judges, use a birthmother's culture of victimization and rescue against
all women. Every time a judge reverses an adoption under these
circumstances, other birthmothers are encouraged to change their
minds.
At the same time, adoptive parents are expected to bond with
and love a child while she is with them, but to immediately give up
custody when the biologic parent later reverses her prior decision.'
Such laws cast "adoptors [sic] in the role of unwilling, unknowing
temporary babysitters," 8 and subvert the ultimate policy goal of stability and finality in adoptions. 99
92. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-14 (1985).
93. Adoptive Parents Committee, Inc.New York City Chapter, Positive Adoption Language, on file with author.
94. Dickson, supra note 21, at 965.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 978.
97. Id. at 968.
98. Id. at 979.
99. See In re A.M., 264 Cal. Rptr. 666, 667 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing the importance of
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The Story of Baby Boy M.

Stephanie M. was an unmarried 15-year-old high school student
when she became pregnant in 1988. Her 19-year-old boyfriend, Steven A., broke up with her when she told him of the pregnancy. She
told her mother and stepfather of her condition when she was in her
seventh month, and with their approval and assistance she placed her
baby boy, born in January of 1989, with adopters, the W's. The W's
cared for and loved Baby Boy M. as their own. Five months later,
Stephanie and Steven got back together. They attended premarital
counseling sessions and Steven enrolled in Alcoholics Anonymous.
They then asked for the return of the baby and the W's refused. The
trial court rendered judgment in favor of the W's. On appeal, however, the court reversed, holding that the offer to permit the adoption of
the child, the making of arrangements for the adoption of the child,
and the failure to support the child do not prove an intent to abandon, sufficient to terminate parental rights. The judge ruled that "the
relationship between the natural mother and her child should not be
terminated through an adoption proceeding unless and until the mother has indicated her consent thereto. . . ."" Thus, at the age of one
and one-half years, Baby Boy M. was removed from the only parents
he had ever known and returned to Stephanie and Steven."'

finality in adoption proceedings); see also Green v. Paul, 31 So. 2d 819, 825 (La. 1947)
(Hamiter, J., dissenting). In his dissent to an adoption revocation case, Justice Hamiter noted:
Pending the appeal here and the proceedings in the trial court more than two years
have elapsed, and during that period much love and devotion undoubtedly have
been kindled between the adoptive parents on the one hand and the child on the
other, to say nothing of the time, energy, and money that those parents have expended. It is inconceivable that the Legislature, in the enactment of the adoption
law, could have contemplated a breaking of those bonds of affection as well as the
wasting of the adoptive parents' efforts, by reason of the unstable whims and
fancies of the natural parent-by the mere changing of his mind.
Id
100. In re Baby Boy M., 272 Cal. Rptr. 27, 31 (Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added).
101. See id Critics argue that much of the pain and tragedy of protracted custody battles
could be avoided if the adoptive parents would just return the baby immediately upon learning of a birthmother's change of mind. Nancy Gibbs, In Whose Best Interest?, TmIE, July 19,
1993, at 47. However, such arguments ignore the length of time that the child may already
have spent with the new family and the relationship that may have developed in that time.
Further, what parent would unquestioningly give up a child in a custody battle when there is
a reasonable expectation that they will obtain judicial relief?
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B. The Pain of Revocation
The Baby Boy M. case is not unusual.t

Adoption cases in

which birthmothers attempt to revoke previously granted consents t 3
are emotionally wrenching and legally sensitive." 4 It is difficult to
accurately determine how often such disputes occur since adoption
proceedings are usually closed to the public and most cases are not
reported.0 5 One network television report estimated that birthmothers
change their minds after placement in fifteen percent of independent

adoptions in California. t 6
The emotions of a birthmother who places her child for adoption
have been discussed, and are frequently the subject of media reports
and movies."t e The increasingly popular search movement, which
encourages adoptees and birthparents to seek each other out for a

relationship later on in life, has one fundamental message at its core:
adoptive parents are not the real parents of the adopted child. Furthermore, it conveys the message that adoptive children and their real
parents suffer will immeasurable pain until they find each other and
reestablish a biologic bond that can never be severed."ta
The tragedy experienced by adopters in revocation cases is less
publicized, yet should not be underestimated." ° Adoptive parents

102. See generally CLARK, supra note 73.
103. See, e.g., Boatman v. Chapman, 329 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. CL App. 1985).
104. Recall the media handling of the Baby Jessica DeBoer case in 1993. In re Clausen,
502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993), stay denied sub nom. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 1
(1993).
105. See CLARK, supra note 73, at 603.
106. FACrBOOK, supra note 5, at 170; see also Stabiner, supra note 9, at 35 (estimating
that birthmothers change their minds in up to 10 percent of cases, including both pre- and
post-placement occurrences). But see Jon D. Hull, The Ties That Traumatize, TIME, Apr. 12,
1993, at 48 (reporting that the National Council for Adoption estimates that less than one
percent of the fifty thousand U.S. adoptions each year are contested).
107. For example, birthmothers were recently given a forum to describe the regret and
remorse they have experienced as a result of placing their children for adoption. 60 Minutes
(CBS television broadcast, Jan. 3, 1994).
108. See SOROSKY Er AL, supra note 15, at 47-72.
109. The trauma suffered by adopters when birthmothers change their minds has been
largely minimized by researchers. For example, Professor Sanford Katz wrote in 1964 that
taking a child from an adoptive home after a significant period of time could result in "disappointment" or "hardship" when the adopters "had become fond of him." Janet Dickson
suggests that this language is more suggestive of a relationship with a pet dog than with a
child. Dickson, supra note 21, at 968 n.263 (referring to Sanford N. Katz, Community Decision-Makers and the Promotion of Values in the Adoption of Children, 4 J. FAM. L. 7, 10
(1964)).
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plan and wait for their child for years.'
They love, parent, and
bond with their child from the moment she is handed to them. When
a child is taken away after living with the adoptive parents for a
period of time, it is reasonable to imagine that the pain of the adopters is akin to the pain a biologic parent would experience if a child
were removed for no legal reason."' This pain may be increased
because the adopters may have already dealt with the grief of infertility; a process psychologists report is as emotionally traumatic as the
loss of a child."'
Adopters also suffer financially in revocation cases. Adoption
expenses, including legal fees and payments for the birthmother's
support and medical costs, are usually burdensome"' and most often
nonrefundable." 4
C. Rationales Behind Laws That Allow Revocation
Several assumptions implicitly underlie a legal culture that allows
a birthmother significant deference to change her decision to give her
child to adoptive parents. The most pervasive rationale is that adopters have no right to adopt in the first place, while biologic parents
have a "fundamental right to raise their children.".. 5 An adoptive
parent thus does not become a "real parent" with attendant rights
until the adoption has been finalized. This rationale dismisses the
rights and feelings of adopters during the adoption process as irrelevant, and is closely related to the disturbing rationale that children
belong with their biologic parents at any cost due to the "mystical
bond" that endures between a birthmother and her baby, which no
stranger can recreate." 6 This rationale is proven false by the fact
that biologically unrelated people, such as stepparents, frequently
establish successful bonding relationships with children, while biologic

110. See, e.g., Komheiser, supra note 6.
111. Dickson, supra note 21, at 968.
112. GILMAN, supra note 34, at 13-14.

113. Independent adoptions cost from $2,000 to $20,000. FACTBOOK, supra note 5, at
172.
114. Mitchell A. Chamey, The Rebirth of Private Adoptions, 71 A.B.A. J. 52, 54 (1985).
Since payments for a birthmother's expenses are considered voluntary and not in exchange
for a baby, they are nonrefundable if a birthmother changes her mind. This could potentially
lead to episodes of extortion on the part of an unscrupulous birthmother.
115. In re Timothy W., 272 Cal. Rptr. 906, 910 (Ct. App. 1990).
116. Cole & Donley, History, Values, and Placement Policy Issues in Adoption, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 273, 284 (David Brodzinsky & Marshall Schechter eds., 1990).
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parents are often unable to effectively relate to their own children." 7

The most disturbing unspoken assumption behind lenient revocation policies is that a "normal" woman would not give up her baby

for adoption,"' or if she did, she would regret it for the rest of her
life. Thus, "the law 'owes [her] every possible opportunity to avoid
making such a mistake."' n 9 This attitude is both demeaning -and discriminatory and representative of a legal culture that disempowers
women by holding that they are deficient in those skills necessary to
make important decisions."
Before the mid-18th century, this view was expressed through

the image of woman as the "weaker vessel.'' Women were considered to be creatures of "intense sexuality and ... fundamental irrationality" who required guidance from men to prevent them from
"slipp[ing] into collusion with evil."'" After the Enlightenment,

"women's intellectual inferiority came to be expressed as an inability

to engage in rigorous abstract thinking. '' " Society's inability to accept a woman's decision to relinquish her child for adoption implies
that women are incompetent to act as rational moral agents. 24 This
implication is reinforced by a judicial system that steps in to correct a

woman's "mistake" for her, even in the face of compelling legal
reasons to do the exact opposite."
The decision to place a child in an adoptive home is never
117. See Dickson, supra note 21, at 983.
118. See Stabiner, supra note 9, at 36.
The public perception is that it is unnatural to give away a child: Why have women, if not to birth their babies? People think that's the way things should be. The
social work corollary is that any woman who will [place a baby for adoption]
cannot possibly be normal and needs weeks of psychiatric care and foster care to
give her more time to change her mind. The system is utterly humiliating and
unfulfilling.
Id
119. Leavitt, supra note 45, at 144.
120. See Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 804 (1989).
121. Id.
122. Id
123. Id.; see also Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on
"Reproduction" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REv. 355, 372 (1989) (positing that the legal
regulation of reproductive experience raises questions such as, "May women be entrusted to
exercise such power [and to make such decisions?]").
124. SHALEv, supra note 40, at 11.
125. An excellent example of such a compelling rationale is the psychological damage
that may result from reversing an adoption. See Marshall S. Zolla & Laurence D. Stick,
When Parents Change Their Minds: Laws Governing Parents' Withdrawal of Consent to
Adoption Should Be Changed to Reflect Principles of Child Development, CALIF. LAW., Jan.
1985, at 18, 20.
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easy,"a but once it is made, volitionally and with purpose, the decision should be irrevocable. The first goal of the law should be to
make the choice to place a child for adoption a free one, not dictated
by the external pressures of the situation. The second goal should be
to ensure that this freely made choice is final. The right to make such
determinations implies the duty to stand by such determinations.
D. History of Withdrawal of Consent Cases
The right to withdraw consent to an adoption is governed by
state statutes, which frequently direct courts to base their decisions on
the child's "best interests,"-a very amorphous standard.'27 Many
states allow revocation when consent was given under fraud, duress,
mistake, undue influence, or some other condition where consent has
been vitiated."
Jurisdictions vary in their recognition or preclusion of the right
to withdraw a valid consent depending largely upon attendant circumstances and policy considerations-e.g., how much weight the court
gives to the policy favoring the maintenance of genetic ties.'29
When biologic parents are allowed to withdraw valid consents to
adoption, the entire institution of adoption is threatened since adoptive
parents are discouraged from adopting out of fear of losing a child
they grow to love. 3 ' Further, prospective adopters might even be
subject to extortion by those threatening to withdraw a previously
granted consent.' When biologic parents are allowed to reverse an
adoption on the grounds that their parents or other relatives forced
them to execute the relinquishment papers, the stage can be set for

126. See, e.g., Maurice M. Suh, Surrogate Motherhood: An Argument for Denial of Specific Performance, 22 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBs. 357, 362 (1989) (arguing that the bonding process experienced during pregnancy gives mothers inalienable rights as parents).
127. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 222(b) (West 1982).
128. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(5) (West 1985) ("Consent may be withdrawn

only when the court finds that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress.").
129. 2 AM. JUR. 2D, Adoption § 103-10 (1994).

130. In re Adoption of D., 252 P.2d 223, 230 (Utah 1953).
[T]he policy of the law should be to assist in every way in establishing a satisfactory parent-child and family relationship. Adoptive parents should not be discouraged by a construction of the law which would cause them to fear the consequences of accepting a child because of the knowledge that the fate of their efforts
would be at the will of the natural parent.
Id.
131. In re Hecker, 448 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969). In such cases, "[s]eeds
for blackmail and extortion [are] planted."
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collusion between the birthmother and her relatives to allege such
fraud or coercion to the detriment of innocent adoptive parents and
children.' 32
Early cases of this nature held that consent was absolutely revocable until a final adoption decree was granted.'33 Courts routinely
held that a mere change of mind on the part of the biologic mother
was sufficient grounds for withdrawal of consent."34 In Green v.
Paul,135 the court concluded that consent, as required for an adop-

tion, must be continual, such that withdrawal of consent at any stage
of an adoption is tantamount to consent having never been given.'36
The court noted that adoption laws must be strictly construed "as they
137
are in derogation of the natural right of the parent to his child."'
The sanctity of the biologic bond was legally preserved even in the
face of clear neglect and expressed intent to surrender parental status.
Other early cases of this nature were decided on the principles of
contract law,131 whereby if courts found that a mother freely signed
a release for adoption, it was as binding as any other contract and
could not be arbitrarily voided absent misrepresentation or duress.
Among the most troubling of these earlier cases are those that
allowed revocation by giving inordinate weight to the maintenance of
the blood relationship.1 39 In Kropp v. Shepsky, the court held that a
birthmother could regain custody of her child because the right of
"natural" parents to raise their children is "fundamental."'"' In
Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Service, 4 ' the court held that
a birthmother could revoke her consent based on the presumption that

132. SENATOR MICHAEL J. TULLY, JR., NEW YORK STATE SENATE INTRODUCER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SENATE BiLL #149, 1993 N.Y. Assembly Bill No. 8887, 215th
General Assembly (1993).
133. See, e.g., Small v. Andrews, 530 P.2d 540 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that the
natural parent is absolutely entitled to withdraw consent at any time prior to an entry of decree).
134. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Thompson, 283 P.2d 493 (Kan. 1955); Green v. Paul,
31 So. 2d 819 (La. 1947).
135. Green, 31 So. 2d 819.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 821-22 n.2.
138. See, e.g., In re Adoption of F., 488 P.2d 130 (Utah 1971). But see Warner v.
Ward, 401 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Ky. 1966) (holding that under traditional contract principles, an
infant 16-year-old birthmother could avoid her commitment to consent due to her age).
139. See, e.g., People e. rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 113 N.E.2d 801 (N.Y. 1953).
140. Id. at 803.
141. 269 N.E.2d 787 (N.Y. 1971), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 805
(1971).
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children "belong" with their "natural" mothers.'42 The court noted
that
"the status of a natural parent" is so important "that in determining
the best interests of the child, it may counterbalance, even outweigh,
superior material and cultural advantages which may be afforded by
adoptive parents ... For experience teaches us that a mother's love
is one factor which will endure: possibly endure after other claimed
material advantages and emotional attachments may have proven
transient."'43
Many courts, reflecting general societal attitudes, still operate
under a traditionalist system that gives the presumption in custody
cases to biologic mothers. What should change first, societal attitudes
or the law? It seems clear that laws must be rewritten to demythologize biologic ties of parenthood before society can recognize and
assimilate, into its cultural subconscious, the notion that children belong in loving homes and biologic parents are no better or worse than
adoptive ones, based purely on their genetic status.
IV. LEGAL OPTIONS
A. Statutory Comparison
Jurisdictions vary in their legal response to adoption revocation
requests. The statutes range from those that favor adoptive parents'
rights to those that give the most deference possible to birthparents.
Each option along the spectrum has a significant effect on the permanence of adoptive relationships.
1. Statutes that Grant Biologic Parents Broad Freedom to
Change Their Minds
Some jurisdictions allow birthmothers the absolute right to revoke consent to adoption until the time when a court has issued a
final decree of adoption.'" In one Pennsylvania case,14 a teenage
girl whose boyfriend broke up with her upon learning of her pregnan142. Id. at 792.
143. Id. at 791 (quoting People ex rel Grament v. Free Synagogue Child Adoption
Comm., 85 N.Y.S.2d 541, 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949).
144. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(c) (1991) ("A consent to an adoption
may only be revoked prior to the earlier of either the entry of a decree of termination of
parental rights or the entry of a decree of adoption."); see also Tax. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 15.03(d) (West 1993).
145. Grimes v. Yack, 433 A.2d 1363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
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cy, placed her child for adoption with a couple who had sought to
adopt. 6 Several months later, the teenager and her boyfriend reconciled and filed a petition to regain custody of the child. The court
found that, despite their youth, and the father's alcohol problem, the
young couple were fit parents, and ordered the adoptive parents to
return the child. 47 In announcing their decision, the court noted a
factually analogous case in which an adopted child was also returned
to her biologic mother. 4 The language of that ruling betrays a paternalistic attitude:
The relationship between parent and child should be broken only
with the greatest reluctance. Here, we think it would be most unjust
to hold the mother to her promise .... She was very young. She
consented to give her child for adoption only in response to her
parents' urging. She received no outside or professional counseling
to guide her in making so agonizing a decision. 49
In a recent Texas case,"' the Court of Appeals reversed a yearold trial court ruling in favor of the adoptive parents and ordered the
child returned to her birthmother. The court stated that even though
the mother signed an affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights and
gave her baby to the adoptive parents, such actions were not evidence
of abandonment sufficient to deny her parental rights.' The court
based its conclusion on the theories that "parents retain a vital interest
in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life" and "a
natural parent's desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children is an interest far more
precious than a property right."'5 The status of the adoptive parents
as parents was thus voided.
2. Statutes that Give Courts Discretion to Act Based on the
Best Interests of the Child
Many jurisdictions permit withdrawal of consent where the court
determines it is in the "best interests" of the child.' Just what is

146. Id. at 1366.

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1377-78.
Id. at 1381 (citing K.N. v. Cades, 432 A.2d 1010 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
Cades, 432 A.2d at 1016.
Swinney v. Mosher, 830 S.W.2d 187 (rex. Ct. App. 1992).
151. Id. at 193.
152. Id. at 195.
153. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-14 (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-209 (Michie
1987); CAL. CIV. CODE § 226a (West 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 915 (1974); IND.
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meant by this standard is often a matter of debate. In a seminal work
on the subject, psychologists J. Goldstein, A. Solnit, and A. Freud
define this term as what would be least detrimental to the child's
development of a sense of security, emotional well-being, continuity
in care, and opportunity to bond with at least one adult who is or
will become the child's psychological parent."5 They argue that
once a child is being nurtured in a loving home, even an adoptive
one, it is absolutely not in the child's best interests to be removed
and placed in a new home, even one of a birthparent.' 55
The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld an adoption on "best
interest" grounds. The court considered the effect that the withdrawal
of consent would have on the child, including the trauma the child
could experience by repeated moves, (e.g., separation anxiety), and
the age of the child, and found that in light of the psychological
impact that an interference with bonding would have on the child, the
child's best interests would be served by not allowing a withdrawal
of consent by the biologic parents. 6
3. Statutes that Permit Revocation Only in Cases of Fraud
Other jurisdictions make consent to adoption irrevocable unless
the, biologic parent can prove that the consent was procured through
fraud or duress." 7 Duress was found to vitiate a previous consent to
adoption in the case of In re G.,' 58 where the court returned an infant to his birthmother noting that consent must be given free from
duress and that, in adoption cases in general, there is a shadowy border area known as "force of circumstances." In this case, the force of
circumstances was a marriage separation and financial difficulties.
Several other cases have been decided in favor of the
birthmother, where the court has found that consent to adoption was
not given freely, though due to circumstances not in the control of

CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-6(f) (West 1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 70-b:10 (1990); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 9:3-17(a) (West 1993); Oiuo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.09(B) (Anderson 1988); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 27-7-1720 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
154. JOSEPH GOLDsTEiN Er AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREsT OF THE CHILD 21 (1979).
155. Id.
156. In re Adoption of Baby C., 480 A.2d 101 (N.H. 1984); c. In re T.E.B.R. and
M.R., Jr., 664 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
157. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106(E) (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(5)
(West 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 50/11 (Snith-Hurd 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-2102(c) (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24(6a) (West 1980); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1255 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5(a) (1993); WYOM. STAT. § 1-22-109(d) (1993).
158. 389 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
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the adoptive parents.' 59 Generally, in these cases the biologic parents
were allowed to reclaim the children they placed for adoption due to
fraud or coercion practiced by their own relatives.
For example, in the case of In re Female F.D.,"6 the
birthmother gave consent for the adoption of her child under constant
pressure to do so by her family. The court allowed her to change her
mind and reclaim the child. But in doing so, the court also noted that
"[n]otwithstanding a finding of duress which would invalidate the

consent, there has been no showing of any unfitness or other circumstance on the part of the natural mother which would prevent her
from withdrawing her consent.' ' 1 t Thus, the standard for terminating
parental rights, namely unfitness, was also used to sanction revocation

of consent.
In Adoption of Robin, 62 the birthmother consented to adoption
after her stepmother threatened to kill both her and her father if she
refused. The court deemed this grounds for voiding the adoption. 63
Other cases have been decided in favor of the biologic parents
due to some act of fraud or coercion practiced by the adoptive parents, their agents, or some other person acting on their behalf. In In
re A.S.,' the biologic parents of a child were allowed to vacate an
order relinquishing their parental rights and consenting to adoption

upon a showing that Child Protective Services, through its case worker, deceived them into consenting to the adoption. Through acts,
omissions, and concealments, the social worker misinformed the par-

159. Meadows v. East, 560 So. 2d 761 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); In re Cheryl E., 207 Cal.
App. Ct. 1993); In re AdopRptr. 728 (Ct. App. 1984); In re Jackson, 611 N.E.2d 1356 (111.
tion of Kindgren, 540 N.E.2d 485 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Sorentino v. Family and Children's
Soc'y of Elizabeth, 367 A.2d 1168 (N.J. 1976); In re Adoption of Female F.D., 433
N.Y.S.2d 318 (Sur. Ct. 1980); In re Adoption of Robin, 571 P.2d 850 (Okla. 1977); In re
A.S., 829 P.2d 791 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
160. 433 N.Y.S.2d 318.
161. Id. at 323.
162. 571 P.2d 850 (Okla. 1977).
App. Ct. 1971) (holding that consent
163. See Huebert v. Marshall, 270 N.E.2d 464 (I11.
given by a birthmother while under the influence of weight-loss medication was not freely
given); In re. J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988), later proceeding, 536 So. 2d 424 (holding
that consent given after birthmother's parents refused to allow her to bring baby to live in
their home was not freely given); Wuertz v. Craig, 458 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1984) (holding that
consent given upon grandmother's threat of criminal child abuse charges-which charges were
not even substantiated-was voidable). But see In re Danielson, 427 N.Y.S.2d 572, 575
(1980) (finding that the birthmother surrendered her child due to her husband's coercive
threat to leave her if she kept the child and ruling that her motive for acquiescence was her
love for her husband, which she chose over the love for her child).
164. 829 P.2d 791 (1992).
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ents that their child had cerebral palsy, which induced them to consent to the adoption. Such fraud, practiced by an agent requesting
consent, undermined the integrity of the relinquishment, and was
deemed sufficient grounds for vitiation.
In the case of In re Cheryl E.,"6 a birthmother gave consent
only after the adoption social worker took improper initiative in pursuing the consent, including visiting the mother's home before birth
and without notice, refusing to meet with the father at the hospital,
obtaining consent in a parked car during a pressured meeting, and
misrepresenting that signing the consent papers would still allow the
mother one year in which to change her mind.
In Sorentino v. Family and Children's Society of Elizabeth,"6
an adoption agency supervisor coerced the birthmother into signing a
surrender of her child for adoption by threatening her with harassment
and litigation, and failing to properly inform her of her options for
care of her child other than irrevocable surrender or return to the
mother. In such cases it is easier to accept the courts' rulings because
the adoptive parents were, in a sense, estopped from benefitting from
the misdeeds of agents acting on their behalf.
In In re Jackson,67 the court refused to reverse a biologic
mother's surrender of her three children because she failed to prove
that her consent was obtained through fraud or duress on the part of
the party before whom such consent was acknowledged." 6 In this
case, there were no adoptive parents yet, but neither the judge nor the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services induced the
mother, through wrongful act, threat, or fraud, to surrender her parental rights. 6 9
In In re Adoption of Kindgren"7 the court affirmed an order to
vacate the biologic mother's consent to adoption. Evidence that the
mother had been given $10,000 by the adoptive parents and grandmother in exchange for her consent to the adoption was sufficient to
establish that the consent was executed fraudulently and as a result of
duress, as practiced by the adoptive parents and their agent.' The
court opined that such a "payment of a consideration for the relin-

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

207 Cal. Rptr. 728 (Ct. App. 1984).
367 A.2d 1168 (NJ. 1976).
611 N.E.2d 1356 (11. App. Ct. 1993).
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1370.
540 N.E.2d 485 (1l. App. Ct. 1989).
Id. at 488.
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quishment" was in violation of a public policy against the buying or
selling of a human being.' 2
In Meadows v. East (In re Adoption of Baby Boy East), "3the

court reviewed a lower court ruling that allowed a biologic mother of
a newborn baby to reclaim her child from the adoptive parents. On

appeal, the court determined that since the mother gave her consent
freely and voluntarily, absent any improper actions by the adoptive
parents or others acting on their behalf, the revocation was of no

legal effect.' 4
As the court in McCurdy v. Albertina Kerr Homes, Inc. inferred, 5 the fraud/duress benchmark can only lead to the demise of
the institution of adoption altogether. Indeed what biologic parent ever
consents to the adoption of her child in the absence of some degree
of duress in circumstances, persuasion by a third party, or emotional
turmoil?
V. PROPOSAL

In 1986, New York State Senator Michael J.Tully, Jr., sponsored a bill to amend the New York Domestic Relations Law in
regard to voiding consent to an adoption that resulted from fraud,
duress, or coercion.' 6 The bill, which has remained in legislative
committee for years, would allow consent to adoption to be voided
only when the fraud, duress, or coercion was practiced by the adoptive parents, their agents, or any other person acting on their behalf,
or for lack of mental capacity on the part of the person giving consent at the time the consent was given. This restriction is currently
the law in Alabama,'" Illinois,' 8 and Washington.' 9

172. Id. at 489 (quoting Gray v. Maxwell, 293 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Neb. 1980)).
173. 560 So. 2d 761 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
174. Id. at 763; see also Kinkead v. Lee, 509 So. 2d 247 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).
175. 498 P.2d 392 (Or. Ct. App. 1972).
176. 1993 N.Y. ASSEMBLY BiLL No. 8887, 215TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, (Jan. 6, 1993).
177. ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-14 (1992)
The consent or relinquishment, once signed or confirmed, may not be withdrawn
except . . . upon a showing that the consent or relinquishment was obtained by
fraud, duress, mistake, or under influence on the part of a petitioner or his agent
or the agency to whom or for whose benefit it was given .... The court shall
not apply any presumption or preference in favor of the natural parents in reviewing an action brought under this section.
Il

178. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750 50/11 (Smith-Hurd 1993):
A consent to adoption by a parent, including a minor .
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In Illinois, the legislative aim in adopting this restriction on
revocation was to bolster the public policy favoring stability and
certainty in adoptions. It also recognized the need to provide a secure
environment for an adopted child and to protect the parties from the
complex psychological problems inherent in permitting a reversal of a
valid adoption.8 In Kathy 0. v. Counseling & Family Services,'
the court upheld the legislative aim in refusing to set aside an adoption agreed to by the birthmother under coercion by her parents. The
court held that duress or fraud by a party other than the adoptive
parents or their agents, does not affect the validity of consent.
When a birthmother seeks to void consent to an adoption and the
child is ultimately removed from the home she has known since birth
and moved into a strange home, the psychological implications for the
child are grave.' 2 Psychologists report increased incidence of anaclitic depression, whose symptoms include social retardation and depressive withdrawal in these children.' In such cases, the best interests of the child appear to be sacrificed, not served. A legislative
pronouncement with uniform application on the acceptable grounds
for revocation of adoption consents would ensure that the child's
interests are neither balanced against, nor subordinated to, the adults'
interests in the case. Proposals that call for a shortening of the time
period in which adoption revocation disputes must be resolved appear
on the surface to be well-founded, but in reality exhibit another bias
against adoptive parents, because often, custody decisions are based
on the development of a strong bond over time. With shorter resolution periods, the chance for legally recognized psychological bonds to
form is lessened.'"

unless it shall have been obtained by fraud or duress on the part of the person
before whom such consent, surrender, or other document equivalent to a surrender
is acknowledged . . . or on the part of the adopting parents or their agents.
Id.
179. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.33.160 (West 1993) ("Within one year after approval,
a consent may be revoked for fraud or duress practiced by the person, department, or agency
requesting the consent, or for lack of mental competency on the part of the person giving the
consent at the time the consent was given.").
180. See Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 858, 863 (IL1.), appeal dismissed, 435

U.S. 963 (1977).
181. 438 N.E.2d 695 (111.App. Ct. 1982).
182. See Zolla and Strick, supra note 125, at 20.
183. Id. But see Nerys Patterson, Accidental Justice for Jessica DeBoer, N.Y.lIMES, July
13, 1993 (arguing that the pain of being rent from one's biologic parents is greater than the
pain of being removed from an adoptive home).
184. See generally GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 154.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Most modem adoption statutes are predicated upon the goal of
protecting the nebulous "best interests" of the child." 5 They aim to
protect the rights of birthmothers by providing that consent to adoption must be given according to strict statutory requirements. They
also aim to ensure the safe and permanent care of children. However,
the statutes, as applied by the courts, lack uniformity. 86 The wide
divergence in judicial decisions in this area stems in part from vague
statutory language, such as the notion of "best interests."'" Because
statutes are often vague and not applied uniformly,"' the fate of
adopted children and their parents is usually left to the discretion of
individual judges. Thus, the role the courts play in the evolution of
social policies regarding adoption and parenting is distinctive, while
overlapping that of the legislative branch.
In 1991, a high school student named Gina Pellegrino fled a
Connecticut hospital where, registered under a phony name, she had
hours before given birth to a baby girl. A search was made, through
news publications and other means, for the baby's parents, but no one
came forward and no one was found. Thus, Pellegrino's parental
rights were terminated and the abandoned baby was placed for adoption. Four months later, Pellegrino surfaced and sued to regain custody, which would mean taking the baby out of the only secure home
she had ever known and sending her to live in a homeless shelter. In
a decision that can only be explained by the judge's blind worship of
the mystique of blood ties, that is just what the court did.'89 Clearly, many courts rule in adoption custody cases for paternalistic rea-

185. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-14 (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-209 (Michie
1987); CAL. CIV. CODE § 226a (West 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 915 (1974); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-6(f) (West 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-b:10 (1990); NJ. Stat.
Ann. § 9:3-17(a) (West 1993); OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.09(B) (Anderson 1988); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 27-7-1720 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
186. Presser, supra note 17, at 513-14.
187. Id. at 513 (positing that some judges consider the best interests of the child, even
though the rule in favor of the biologic parent is due to a desire to "return to the more
stable sureness of an imagined past where kinship ties were paramount").
188. The National Conference of Commissioners on State Laws is in the midst of a
multi-year process of adoption law reform. Its goal is to draft model legislation for states to
follow, thereby creating uniformity where none now exists. Sally Johnson, Rights Versus
Wrongs in Adoption Law, INSIGHT, Sept. 20, 1993, at 12.
189. In re Baby Girl. B., 1992 WL 66688 (Conn. Super. Ct.), aff'd 618 A.2d 1 (Conn.
1992).
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sons,190 such as to protect a perceived exploited birthmother and to

preserve the mythically revered biologic bonds of parenthood. In the
interests of preserving the value of self-determination, however, courts
should refrain from acting for paternalistic reasons in this area, especially in the absence of legislative direction. '
The politics .manifest in the adoption scheme are often difficult
to reconcile, with "conservatives" often waiving pro-adoption banners
merely as a pretextual subversion of abortion rights and "liberals"
denigrating adoption as exploitive, often as a pretextual elevation of
abortion rights. 1"
As Bartholet posits, ideally, adoption should be viewed as a
critical aspect of a woman's reproductive freedom, which adds to the
realm of "choice" by enabling those who become pregnant but do not
want to parent, to give their children to those who want to be parents. Women should be able to make this choice without being
assaulted by the message that they are doing something gravely
wrong, or that the only way to achieve a "sense of personhood" is to
achieve a biologic pregnancy at any cost."9
The decision to relinquish parental rights and place a child for
adoption is complex, considered, and certainly painful, resulting often
from a long emotional and physical siege of frustration, exhaustion,
and ambivalence. Absent fraud on the part of those benefitting from
this decision, when a woman is allowed to change her mind, by
claiming that she did not understand the effects of her action or that
she was lacking in those faculties necessary to make such an important decision, she contributes to the subordination (political, rather
than economic or sexual) of all women. Concededly, the mother in
such a situation does not likely consider what her actions will mean
to the perpetration of gender oppression. She simply wants her baby
back. But the role that legal institutions play in impeding or producing social change is unique and far-reaching. A paternalistic legal
system that steps in to save a woman from her feeble-minded mistakes disempowers women and contributes to a cultural denigration of
adoption. Most significantly, however, such a system causes society to
lose sight of a crucial fact: Adoption makes children part of families
190. See David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519
(1988).
191. Id.

192. BARmTOLEr, supra note 1, at xxi.
193. Id.
194. Id., at xxii.
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who want them-families created with tremendous effort, intent, and
passion. Rethinking revocation benefits these children.
Mindy Schulman Roman
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